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III. HUMAN
RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL SECTIONS
REFEREED PAPERS
Injured Workers
and Lost Time:
Do High-Performance Workplace Practices Make a Difference?
KAREN
S. MARKEL
Oakland University
KAREN
ROBERTS
Michigan State University
Abstract
This
paper examines the effect of high-performance workplace practices on
the likelihood to lose time from work or file a lost time workers compensation
claim due to a workplace injury. Data have been collected from both
a random sample of injured workers (over two time periods) and their
employers. Sample size is approximately 1,058 workers. High-performance
workplace practices include the presence of workplace committees, recruitment
practices, employee control over their work, the presence of teams and
several types of incentive pay systems. Results reveal that several
high-performance workplace practices do predict the likelihood that
injured workers will lose time from work.
Innovative work practices
are receiving a great deal of attention both in the workplace and by researchers.
These workplace practices, often referred to as high-performance or high-involvement,
are characterized to both encourage worker participation in the organization
as well as increase their autonomy over their own work and productivity.
Often these practices include the design of work into a team-based organization
or one with various committees, increased training, and/or recruiting
a workforce open to new ideas and interested in taking responsibility
for their own and/or their team's work.
New
types of incentive pay systems are also on the increase in these types
of organizations. For example, as more and more work activities are carried
out in teams, it becomes harder to monitor the effort of individual workers.
By making the compensation system contingent on the contributions or effectiveness
of individual workers or work teams, employees will be more likely to
engage in improving the work system and overall firm productivity (Pil
and MacDuffie 1996). These pay systems are often characterized by their
ability to reward workers both for their own or their team's contribution
to productivity. These systems seek to reward employees in relation to
overall firm productivity in order to increase employee involvement and
commitment to the organization. Examples of these types of incentive programs
include team-based, knowledge-based or merit-based pay that typically
allocate a percentage of the pay in relation to a measure of team productivity,
knowledge of the job, or effort, respectively.
These
new workplace practices are designed to elicit the discretionary effort
often untapped in traditional organizations (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg,
and Kalleberg 2000). Many studies have shown that high-performance workplaces
are performing at greater capacity than traditional organizations (e.g.,
Appelbaum et al. 2000; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997). One plausible
outcome of the typically increased work pace and production "uptime"
associated with high-performance work practices is higher injury rates.
There has been some evidence that these high-involvement workplace practices
and incentive systems are associated with higher rates of cumulative trauma
disorders (CTDs) in manufacturing organizations (e.g., Adler, Goldoftas,
and Levine 1997; Brenner, Fairris, and Ruser 2000; Fairris and Brenner
2001). Cumulative trauma disorders are conditions such as carpal tunnel
syndrome, which originate in repeated pressures, vibration, or motion.
The case study research in this area, most often conducted at automobile
manufacturing plants, has established a link between increased rates of
CTDs at high-performance workplaces, most often attributed to the increased
work pace at these organizations (e.g., Adler et al. 1997). As Rinehart
(1999) surmises, these high involvement workplace practices are implemented
at the discretionary cost to the worker: "The true buffers in this
system are workers." To date, the research on the relationship between
high-involvement workplace practices and worker injury has concentrated
on injury rates. The research reported here examines the relation between
high-involvement workplace practices and the likelihood that a worker
loses work time due to his or her workplace injury.
The
expectation is that the likelihood of increased work time is greater in
high-performance workplaces. The high-involvement work organization is
designed to create a cooperative work environment with strong employee
commitment to both their peers and the organization. Once an injured worker
cannot be fully productive, absenteeism is more likely because the worker
cannot unleash the discretionary extra effort expected under a high-performance
work regime. Further, if the production process is team-based, other team
members are likely to discourage the return of a less than fully productive
team member. The following hypothesis will test this relationship: High-performance
work practices will be positively related to the likelihood of losing
time from work.
Incentive
pay systems may have the opposite relation to the likelihood to lose time
from the workplace due to relation to overall compensation. These rewards
may create competitiveness among employees (Randall 1999), and injured
employees may be more likely to remain at work in order to reap these
monetary rewards. The following hypothesis will test this relationship:
incentive pay systems will be negatively related to the likelihood of
losing time.
Data and Methods
The
data used in this paper is from a study of work-related illness and injury
in the state of Michigan. The purpose of the study was to investigate
the determinants of the decision to file a workers' compensation claim
and the social, economic, and work-related consequences of filing. The
data were collected from individuals with work-related injuries or illnesses
and their employers. Michigan statute requires health care providers to
report work-related injuries or illnesses to the state Department of Consumer
and Industry Services.
Two
waves of data were collected from individuals in a telephone survey. The
first wave of data collected for individuals resulted in 1,599 respondents
(response rate of 70.4 percent). The second data collection occurred 1
year after wave one. The response rate for wave two was 69.9 percent so
that the total sample size with two waves of data was 1,118. An employer
survey was distributed to organizations that employed an injured worker
from wave 1 of our study. Fifty employers responded (response rate of
87 percent). The survey included questions on the organization of work,
human resource management practices, disability management practices,
and basic workplace characteristics. Each individual respondent was matched
with the respective employer characteristics for this research. Sixty
observations were removed for individuals who reported working for a different
employer at each wave, resulting in a total sample of 1,058 individuals.
Sample
descriptives and measures included in this study are detailed in Table
1. We controlled for the following individual characteristics: sex, age,
race, education, and level of injury impairment. Organizational high-performance
work practices included: the presence of workplace committees, recruitment
practices, worker control over their work, and the presence of teams.
Incentive pay systems included: knowledge-based pay, merit-based pay,
team-based pay, and stock-based pay. These variables were regressed on
two measures of lost time: absence from work and filing a lost time workers'
compensation claim. Logistic regression was used to examine the hypothesized
relations. For all analyses, the standard errors for each equation were
adjusted for clustering on company ID. The standard errors accounted for
the shared variance among workers within the same company.

Results and Discussion
Several
models were estimated to test the hypotheses both for experiencing lost-time
or filing a lost-time claim. (See Tables 2 and 3, respectively.) The most
important covariate included in estimating these models was injury severity,
which retained a highly significant and positive relationship to both
the likelihood of losing time and filing a lost-time claim.
Table
2 presents the results for the relations of these workplace practices
on the likelihood of losing time. As hypothesized, several of the high-performance
workplace practices are significantly and positively related to the likelihood
of lost time. The presence of committees, teams and specific knowledge
skills and abilities in recruiting were all associated with increased
likelihood to lose time.
Because
incentive pay systems are less likely to be implemented together, separate
models were estimated to test these relations while controlling for both
the covariates and high-performance work practices. Only merit-based pay
was significantly related to the likelihood to lose time. Workers in organizations
with merit-based pay are less likely to lose time from work due to their
injury. However, it is interesting to note that after including measures
of incentive pay systems in these models, the presence of committees and,
in two cases, recruitment, remained significant.
Table
3 presents the results for the relations of these workplace practices
on the likelihood to file a lost-time workers' compensation claim. Although
the results for the high-performance workplace practices are similar to
those for the likelihood to lost time, none of the incentive pay systems
are significantly related to filing a lost-time workers' compensation
claim.
This
research is the first study to examine the relation between high-performance
work practices, incentive pay systems and lost time among injured workers.
While both previous research and organizations have espoused the productivity
gains of these practices, the costs in terms of increased injury or losses
due to injury are just beginning to be examined. This research found that
organizations with high-performance work practices such as teams, committees
and recruiting for specific knowledge, skills and abilities are related
to the likelihood of both lost time from the injury as well as the filing
of a lost- time workers' compensation claim. This lost time is costly
to the organization and its overall productivity, and the experiences
of injured workers should be considered in light of any efficiency gains.
The
lack of findings between the presence of incentive pay systems and both
types of lost time should be tested in future research. Injured workers
or those losing time from a workplace injury may alter their eligibility
to receive these types of incentive pay, and studies which capture that
information may provide insight into why these practices might not be
related to the likelihood of losing time, especially after accounting
for the presence of high-involvement work practices.
Acknowledgments
This
work was supported by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health. The authors would like to thank the other researchers funded by
this grant as well as participants at the Workers' Compensation Research
Group meeting, where a previous draft of this paper was presented.
References
Appelbaum, Eileen,
Peter Berg, Thomas Bailey, and Arne L. Kalleberg. 2000. Manufacturing
Advantage: Why High-Performance Work Systems Pay Off. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University.
Adler, Paul S.,
Barbara Goldoftas, and David L. Levine. 1997. "Ergonomics, Employee
Involvement, and the Toyota Production System: A Case Study of Nummi's
1993 Model Introduction." Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
Vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 416-37.
Brenner, Mark D.,
David Fairris, and John Ruser. 2000. "'Flexible' Work Practices and
Occupational Safety and Health: Exploring the Relationship between Cumulative
Trauma Disorders and Workplace Transformation." Unpublished paper.
Fairris, David,
and Mark Brenner. 2001. "Workplace Transformation and the Rise of
Cumulative Trauma Disorders: Is There a Connection?" Journal of
Labor Research, Vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 15-28.
Ichniowski, Casey,
Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi. 1997. "The Effects of Human
Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing
Lines." American Economic Review, Vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 291-313.
Pil, Frits K., and
John Paul MacDuffie. 1996. "The Adoption of High-Involvement Work
Practices." Industrial Relations, Vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 423-55.
Rinehart, James.
1999. "The International Motor Vehicle Program's Lean Production
Benchmark: A Critique." Monthly Review (January), pp. 19-27.
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