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X. THE SHARED CAPITALISM ROUTE TO THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY
Show Me the Money: Does Shared Capitalism Share the Wealth?
Robert Buchele
Smith
College
Loren Rodgers
National
Center for Employee Ownership
Adria Sharf
University
of Washington
Abstract
Based on two sets of data—the
National Bureau of Economic Relations (NBER) Shared Capitalism Project surveys
of employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) companies and the national General
Social Survey—we find that employees in ESOP companies have significant
holdings of employer stock. While salaried workers in ESOP companies have
larger account balances than hourly workers do, hourly workers in ESOPs do
significantly better than hourly workers in general, both in terms of
ownership and earnings. More broadly, the median pension wealth of ESOP participants
is over four times higher than the median household pension wealth. ESOP retirement
plans do, however, remain too concentrated in employers' stock.
Cheerleaders for the "ownership society" tout the growing share of U.S. households
owning stock—from 31.7 percent in 1989 to 51.9 percent in 2001 counting both
direct and indirect ownership (Wolff 2004, Table 12b). What is less often
advertised is that as of 2001 the bottom 90 percent of households own only
23 percent of all stock and just 12 percent of all directly held stock, which
confers direct control (voting) rights on stockholders (Wolff 2004, Table
13a; Kennickell 2003, Table 10). Only 30 percent of households in the bottom
90 percent of the wealth distribution owns (directly or indirectly) more than
$10,000 of stock (Wolff 2004, Table 13a). If the ownership society is defined
in terms of households' ownership stake in the U.S. economy, the huge majority
of American households are decidedly minority owners.
These statistics on the concentration
of stock ownership are reflected in the data on pension wealth as well.
Thirty-four percent of households have no pension plan (Wolff 2005, Table
5), and "more than one-fifth of all households nearing retirement (those
between the ages of 56 and 64) had no retirement savings other than Social
Security" (Weller and Wolff 2005, 2). In 2001 average pension wealth (in defined
benefit and defined contribution plans) was $94,800, but the median—the
pension wealth of the typical household—was only $10,900 (Wolff 2005, Table
11). This paper assesses the potential of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)
for increasing both workers' pension wealth and their ownership stake in the
companies they work for.
Employee Stock Ownership: Forms and Financials
Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein (2003, Appendix C) calculate that in
2002 there were 24.1 million participants in 11,561 pension plans that held
company stock.1 About
8.2 million (34 percent) of these participants were in ESOPs, and these held
59 percent of all company stock in employee pension plans. In all, it is probably
safe to say that at least half of all company stock owned by employees is
held in ESOP retirement accounts (Rosen 2005). ESOPs were created as a form
of defined contribution pension plan by legislation attached to the
Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. Favorable tax
treatment of income from the sale of company stock to ESOPs and of company
profits contributed to ESOPs has encouraged their rapid growth and made
them the most common form of employee ownership in the United States.
Several studies of the wealth effects of ESOPs have been conducted
in recent years. These include (1) a census of Washington State ESOPs (Kardas,
Scharf, and Keogh 1998), which found median pension assets per participant
of $31,600 (versus $5,400 for a matching sample of non-ESOP control companies);
(2) a 2005 study of Ohio companies, which found median ESOP account balances
of $30,000 (cited in Rosen 2005); (3) a 2005 census of Massachusetts ESOPs,
which reported average assets per participant of $56,200 (Mackin 2005); and
(4) a survey of sixteen S corporation ESOPs, which found median employee account
balances of $75,000ø$100,000 (Rosen 2005).
Here we develop new estimates of employee stock ownership and pension assets
based on two large-scale employee surveys: the 2002 national General Social
Survey (GSS), which provides a representative sample of 1,120 private sector
employees, and the National Board of Economic Research (NBER) Shared Capitalism
Research Project, which includes a sample of 6,000 employees in nine ESOP
companies.2
A Profile of Nine ESOPs
There are reasons to believe that employee stock ownership might
have positive effects on workplaces and company performance, and the evidence,
though mixed, broadly supports this view on some important measures (Kruse
2002; Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2006). Table 1 provides a first look
at workers' ownership stakes in the nine ESOP companies in the NBER study.
These firms vary in size from a few hundred to thousands of employees.
They are spread across service and manufacturing industries, and they vary
in the length of time that their ESOPs have existed (from four to twenty-four
years) and in the percentage of the company's stock held in the ESOP.
ESOPs are broad-based defined contribution pension plans,
which normally include all full-time (and often also permanent part-time)
employees meeting basic requirements of age, hours of service, and months
of service, with limited exceptions allowed by ERISA) Self-reported participation
rates among the nine companies in the NBER study vary from 64 to 95 percent,
with an average of 84 percent. It may be worth noting that the three companies
with the highest participation rates (all around 95 percent) have by far the
highest average account balances—ranging from $129,000 to $257,000. At the
other end of the range, the lowest average account balance is just $5,400.
In all, the average account balance of all ESOP participants was $104,600,
but including employees without ESOP accounts and participants with zero balances
reduces the mean account balance of all employees to $81,500.
The ratio of mean to median account balances is an indication of
the dollar "distance" between the stock holdings in the largest accounts versus
the typical account. This varies from 1.1:1 to 3.6:1 and is 3.5:1 for all
ESOP participants in the data set. This higher ratio for all employees reflects
the effect of interfirm differences in average account balances as well
as the intrafirm inequality reflected in the company-specific
ratios.
All but one of the NBER companies had 401(k) pension plans as well
as ESOPs, and almost two thirds of the employees of these ESOP companies had
401(k) retirement plans—one of which included company stock in the

401(k).
Table 2 shows the value of total pension assets held in all retirement plans
and the value of employer stock held in these plans. Mean pension assets for
all employees of these ESOP companies is $105,900, and the mean for those
who own some employer stock is $130,300. The mean value of employer stock
held by employee owners is $90,600, and an average of two thirds of employees'
pension assets are in employer stock (though this percentage varies widely
among companies from 25 percent to 100 percent). These figures suggest
that while most workers in ESOPs have other diversified retirement plans,
the bulk of their retirement assets remain invested in their employers' stock.
Diversification of pension assets would seem to remain an important
issue for many ESOP participants.3
The Distribution of Stock Ownership and Earnings within Firms
Table 3 compares the employees of the NBER ESOP companies with
the GSS national survey of employees (or the subset of those who work for
private for-profit companies). The GSS data indicate that about 25 percent
of private sector employees own company stock, including 34 percent of salaried
employees and 19 percent of hourly workers. Of course, the percentage of owners
is much higher for employees of ESOP companies, and, more importantly perhaps,
the ownership gap between salaried and hourly employees is much smaller (in
relative terms).


Average holdings of employer's stock by salaried employees in ESOP
companies is $130,500, and the average holdings of salaried ESOP participants
is $149,800. For the wider economy represented by the GSS sample, salaried
employee-owners have an average of $170,200 in company stock. But hourly employee-owners
in the GSS hold an average of only $24,000 of their employers' stock versus
$47,100 for hourly employee-owners in the NBER companies.
Employer stock in employee ESOP accounts is purchased by the ESOP
and given to employees. (Employer stock acquired in other plans may be paid
for by the employer or by the employee.) However, the formal accounting rules
might not reflect the true incidence of the cost of employer stock contributions
if those contributions substitute for other forms of compensation. Thus, employees
with ESOPs might pay for their company stock with lower wages than they would
otherwise earn. Comparison of the earnings of employees in the NBER ESOPs
versus the GSS national sample (bottom of Table 3) shows that ESOP company
employees' earnings are 16 percent higher than earnings of the (private,
for-profit sector) employees in the GSS ($42,745 versus $36,950). The earnings
advantage to ESOP company employees is even higher for hourly employees, whose
earnings are 33 percent higher than those of hourly employees in the national
sample ($32,956 versus $24,829).
Employer stock in ESOPs is allocated according to legal requirements
that make it no less equally distributed than taxable (W-2) pay (with a cap
of $210,000 on eligible earnings that limits allocations to top management).
But what about the distribution of pay in employee-owned companies? Hourly
workers' earnings average 53 percent of salaried workers' earnings in the
ESOP companies compared to 44 percent for the wider economy (bottom of Table
3). Hourly workers in ESOP companies get lower pay and less stock than salaried
workers, but they do significantly better than hourly workers in general,
with respect to both earnings and ownership.
Table 4 takes a closer look
at the distribution of annual earnings in ESOP companies and the general economy.
Here again we see that mean and median earnings are higher in the ESOP companies
(column 1) than in the wider economy (column 2). Moreover, the earnings ratio
between the highest (90th percentile) and lowest (10th percentile) paid employees
is more than two and a half times higher in general than it is in ESOP companies
(8.95 versus 3.48). In terms of earnings, for whatever reason, less-skilled
(hourly) workers appear to do much better in ESOP companies than elsewhere.
Pension Wealth
Table 5 reports the pension wealth of participants in ESOPs, 401(k)s,
and other plans in the NBER ESOP companies compared with employer stock ownership
in the GSS sample and with Edward Wolff's (2005) estimates of household pension
wealth in defined benefit and defined contribution retirement
plans. GSS employee-owners (many of whom are undoubtedly in ESOPs) have 10
percent more employer stock, on average, than employee-owners in the NBER
ESOP companies, but their median holdings of employer stock are only 29 percent
as much as ESOP participants' median holdings. A comparison of all plan assets
of
workers in the NBER data with Wolff's estimates of household pension wealth
shows a 37 percent higher average pension wealth for ESOP participants and
an over four times higher median pension wealth.4
Finally, we recall Wolff's calculation that the bottom 90 percent
of households owns just 23.1 percent of all stock. A similar calculation for
employees of the ESOP companies in the NBER data (both participants and nonparticipants)
finds that the bottom 90 percent owns 34.5 percent of the company stock
and 39.8 percent of all assets their retirement plans.

Conclusions
This study of employer stock ownership in ESOP companies and in
the wider economy indicates that average ESOP balances are substantial, compared
to average levels of company stock ownership in general. While salaried employees
do much better than hourly employees in these ESOPs, hourly employees do significantly
better in ESOP companies than their counterparts do in the wider economy.
Moreover, there is no evidence that employees with ESOPs (either hourly or
salaried) pay for their company stock in lower wages. Quite the contrary—earnings
are significantly higher in ESOP companies than in general, especially
for hourly employees.
Finally we note that, while
far from adequate from the standpoint of financing retirement, the median
pension wealth of ESOP participants is over four times higher than the median
household pension wealth (Table 5) and that company stock ownership in ESOPs,
while highly concentrated, is considerably less concentrated than stock ownership
in general. If all employees worked for ESOP companies like those in the NBER
study, the distribution of stock ownership would be considerably more equal
than it is.
Acknowledgments
This research is supported
by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation.
We thank Douglas Kruse for his invaluable service in compiling the employee
survey data used in this study.
Notes
1.
As Kruse (2002) points out, these figures double count companies and
employeeswho have more than one plan. His calculations (for 1998) suggest
a lower-bound estimate of around 20 million employees (or 18 percent of all
private sector workers) holding stock in their companies through various defined
contribution pension plans (ESOPs, KSOPs, and 401(k)s that hold employer stock)
and profit-sharing and employee stock purchase plans in 2002.
2.
The NBER study includes fourteen companies, nine with ESOPs and six withbroad-based
stock option plans (one company had both types of plans). While the study
selected companies to vary in size and industry, it is not a representative
sample of all ESOPs or broad-based stock option plans, as key sampling criteria
in some cases were researcher company contacts and company willingness/unwillingness
to allow their employees to be surveyed.
3.
The law provides for increased diversification for employees approaching
retire-ment. Employees who have been participants for ten years and who have
reached age fifty-five have the right to diversify up to 25 percent
of the employer stock in their accounts. At age sixty they can diversify up
to 50 percent.
4.
Note that this comparison understates the pension wealth gap between employeeswith
ESOPs and other employees for two reasons: (1) Wolff's Survey of Consumer
Finance data includes ESOP participants, and (2) it reports pension assets
per household, which
may combine the pensions of more than one employee.
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