Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the major
transformations of the Swedish model. The changes during the 1990s toward a
more restrictive and anti-inflationary macroeconomic policy, the reorientation
of active labor market policies toward supply-oriented measures, and the
structural reforms undertaken in the social protection systems suggest a revival
and renaissance of the traditional Swedish model. The Swedish
welfare state remains clearly universal and inclusive in nature and still
enjoys a high level of public support. In our view, these developments
reinforce the coherence of the Swedish model and the robustness of its social
cohesion.
Introduction
By any international
standards, Sweden has, up to the end of the 1980s, been remarkably successful
in combining low unemployment with not only high and growing employment rates
but also low income dispersion and small gender disparities. However, most
economists and many policy makers were aware that the unprecedented activity
level and the extreme labor market tightness during the second half of the
1980s were in the long run not sustainable. In the early 1990s the Swedish
economy experienced the most dramatic crisis since the early 1930s. In just
three years—from 1990 to 1993—the rate of open unemployment quintupled from
less than 2 to more than 8 percent of the labor force. By contrast, from the
second half of the 1990s the Swedish economy has undergone a particularly
favorable development: gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates have returned
to early 1970s levels; unemployment has been cut by half; there have been large
balance-of-trade surpluses; and public finances have improved substantially.
During the last decade, in strong contrast with the 1980s, the Swedish economy
has also experienced low inflation.
It
has been argued that what Sweden endured in the early 1990s demonstrates that
the original "Swedish model" had become "time inconsistent" in the sense that
it was destined to give rise to developments incompatible with its long-term
sustainability. However, such interpretations give rise to some critical
questions. Is it true that "the traditional," original model elaborated during
the 1950s has succumbed and that a fundamentally different, more coherent and
sustainable model has today emerged? What are the main differences between the
current national model, the original model, and the one that prevailed during
the period 1975Ð1990?
1. The Origin,
Rise, and Decline of the Swedish Model
The "Traditional Model"
From its creation in the
early 1950s up to the mid-1970s, the traditional Swedish model was based on
three fundamental components:
1. A restrictive fiscal and monetary policy aiming at curbing the rate
of inflation in a regime of fixed exchange rates. Such an anti-inflationary
policy should be complemented by policy measures aiming at preserving "full and
productive employment"
2. A centralized
and coordinated wage bargaining system and the application of a wage norm, the
so called solidaristic wage policy based on equity (equal pay for equal work)
and efficiency (that is, fostering rationalization at the company level and
promoting productivity-enhancing structural changes through closure of
unproductive plants)
3. The implementation of an ambitious countercyclical active
labor market policy (ALMP) favoring occupational and geographical mobility and
enhancing employment opportunities for those with reduced work capacity
It goes without saying
that the overall macroeconomic policies, while being restrictive enough to
prevent inflationary pressures, should be expansionary enough to secure both
employment growth and a low unemployment rate. Low unemployment should be
secured mainly by ALMP programs favoring a reallocation of the labour force
from the declining parts of the economy1 toward the expanding ones. Such a model or policy strategy, often referred to
as "the Rehn-Meidner Model,"2 presupposed the existence of powerful
and autonomous employees' and employers' organizations and a high degree of
consensus/cooperation between them and also between the two sides of industry
and the government. The solidaristic wage policy involved not only the application
of the equity principle of "equal pay for equal work" (irrespective of
individual firms' profitability, industries, or regions) but also became an
instrument for reducing wage differentials within occupations—that is, to
promote a more compressed wage structure.
The
policies pursued, based on a strong political commitment to the goal of full
employment and to egalitarian ideals, resulted in a remarkably low unemployment
rate. Furthermore, by international standards, Sweden stood out as rather
successful in terms of labor market participation, gender equal opportunity,
egalitarian income distribution and—disregarding the period from the mid-1970s
to the early 1980s—sustained economic growth. To a considerable extent the good
employment records experienced during this period were also related to an
expansion of public employment and the creation of a modern welfare state,
implying a strong public involvement in the financing and provision of health
care, social care, and education.
Early Warnings:
The Crisis of the Late 1970s and Deviations from the Original Model
Actually, the Swedish
economy started to show serious signs of weakness long before the dramatic
economic downturn and employment crisis of the early 1990s. In fact, from the
mid-1970s the worsening of Sweden's macroeconomic performances in the wake of
the two oil crises, a restrictive economic policy in major Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and the intensified
competition from Japan, Korea, and the Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC),
was met by means of extraordinary policy interventions, notably devaluations of
the Swedish currency, implying apparent deviations from the policies prescribed
by the model per se. The repeated devaluations carried out in the late 1970s
and early 1980s were also the reflection of the inability of the social
partners to achieve a wage development compatible with the preservation of
macroeconomic balance and the maintenance of international competitiveness of
Swedish companies in a regime of fixed exchange rates. The "cost" and "deficit"
and "structural" crises of the late 1970s were, however, never translated into
a severe "employment" crisis, due in particular to the massive expansion of
employment in the public sector. The social insurance systems remained intact,
and the public (especially the municipal) provision of health and social care
was in fact expanded.
The Crisis of
the Early 1990s
By
contrast, the crisis of the early 1990s took the form of a dramatic employment crisis. Why was this allowed to happen, and what are the main factors
explaining the sharp increase of unemployment? Why was the emerging cost
crisis, which was clearly observable well before 1990, not met by
"over--bridging" and devaluation policies similar to those implemented during
the previous decades?
The
use of an accommodative monetary policy as a means of combating excessive
"home-made" inflation, which reached 11 percent in 1990, was unanimously
rejected. The common understanding was that the country could not afford a
repetition of what happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The center-right
government in power from 1991 to 1994 tried to counteract the devaluation
expectations by means of restrictive fiscal policy involving substantial
reductions in public spending, and it was in this respect supported by the
social democrats now in opposition after having taken some steps in the same
direction before losing the election in 1991. However, these policies, in
combination with the original cost crisis and the high interest rates, resulted
in soaring unemployment, decreasing public revenues, and—in spite of the
cutbacks of public expenditures—a rapidly increasing budget deficit.
Apparently, many actors on the international financial markets came to the
conclusion that Sweden would, as in the past, soon devaluate. The attempts to
defend the Swedish currency had thus resulted in reinforcing the devaluation
expectations! In November 1992 the central bank had to allow the Swedish Krona
to float. It became immediately depreciated by about 20 percent.
Needless
to say, the policy failures behind the crisis of the early 1990s became
extremely costly for Swedish citizens. Between 1990 and 1993 the Swedish GDP
decreased by 5 percent. The consequences were especially painful for vulnerable
groups hit by unemployment and/or by the reductions in social benefits and
public commitments that became elements of the emergency measures carried out.
Since 1994
the macroeconomic and labor market conditions have improved in many ways. The
central bank has been, on the whole, rather successful in fulfilling its task
to keep a low inflation rate and to uphold its independence and autonomy
vis-ˆ-vis the government and the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag).
By early 2001 the budget deficit had turned into a surplus. Between 1993 and
2000 GDP yearly growth rate was on average 3.2 percent. This relatively rapid
growth reflects a substantial increase in exports fostered by the depreciation
of the Swedish currency and wage moderation. The rate of unemployment remained
above 8 percent until 1997, but by 2002 it had declined to about 4 percent.
2. The Recent
Transformations of the Swedish Model
Reorientation of Macroeconomic Policy
The devaluations in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, and the deep crisis of the early 1990s, demonstrate
that the policies pursued, in particular the lack of an institutionalized
anti-inflationary mechanism, involved strong elements of time inconsistency.
According to the traditional model developed in the 1950s, the macroeconomic
policies should be restrictive to keep the inflation at a level consistent with
a fixed foreign exchange rate regime.
The
reorientation of monetary and fiscal policy started in 1993 with the
establishment of an inflation target, the fulfilment of which became the
autonomous central bank's main objective.3 The Swedish currency was allowed to float. Consequently, the government and the
two sides of industry have to consider the fact that the autonomous and
independent central bank will react to inflationary fiscal policies or
excessive wage increases by increasing its interest rates and thus decreasing
employment. This new division of roles and responsibilities between the
government and the central bank means that the anti-inflationary policies
prescribed by the Rehn-Meidner model have been institutionalized in a way that
precludes the kinds of inflation-generating policy failures observed in the
late 1970s and late 1980s. These new developments represent, in our view, a strengthening
of, rather
than a deviation from, the traditional Swedish model.
Active Labor
Market Policies
Sweden's excellent record on employment and unemployment has often
been ascribed to a particularly ambitious ALMP. The ALMP has played
a vital role in Swedish stabilization policies since the late 1950s
and constitutes, as mentioned previously, one of the corner stones
of the Swedish model. ALMP programs have been used not only to promote
an efficient allocation of resources and facilitate transitions from
unemployment to employment but also to favor the integration of marginal
workers—for example, the disabled—who without public intervention
would have been excluded from the labor force. Two key and distinctive
features of Swedish employment policy may be identified: on the one
hand, the public authorities wish to put the accent on measures promoting
the integration of unemployed workers instead of passive support (that
is, activation); on the other hand, the two sides of industry are
given a key role in the design and implementation of ALMP programs,
thereby insuring its social legitimacy.
The early
1990s also saw a reorientation of the ALMP emphasizing measures designed to
improve matching efficiency and develop occupational and geographical mobility.
The number of participants in vocational training programs and/or practical
insertion courses rose quickly, while traditional measures focusing on labor
demand remained at a much lower level than during previous recessions. The
growing role of vocational training in the ALMP is therefore evidence of the
importance that the government and the social partners give to occupational
mobility and to the development of skills over the life course. In our view, the
reorientation of ALMP in the early 1990s toward more -supply-oriented programs
can be considered as a retour au source to the initial conception of ALMP
interventions that better meet the increasing demand for skill upgrading and
occupational mobility.
Transformations
of Industrial Relations
For more than twenty-five
years (1955Ð1982) the third important component of the traditional model has
been a wage formation process based on a centralized and coordinated bargaining
system. In 1983 the Engineering Employers' Organisation concluded a separate
agreement with the Metal Workers' Union, departing from over two decades of a
centralized and coordinated bargaining system. The combination of the
abandonment of interprofessional agreements, the erosion of the Swedish model
of industrial relations—in particular the weakening of mechanisms for
coordinating collective bargaining—and the resurgence of industrial disputes
during the 1980s led the social partners to formulate new strategies in the
early 1990s.
While
the conjunction of several factors explains the "Swedish Success Story," there
are strong reasons to believe that changes in the Swedish industrial relations
system that occurred in the mid-1990s, in particular the changes in the
regulation of collective bargaining and wage formation, have played an
important role in this development. Although these changes show that the two
sides of industry are nowadays prone to accept a re-coordination of industry-wide
agreements and give the traded goods sector a leadership role in wage
determination, it would be erroneous to interpret these new tendencies as a
weakening of enterprise-level bargaining. In fact, industry-wide agreements
leave ample scope for enterprise-level negotiations, particularly regarding the
distribution of the individualized part of the wage increase negotiated and concluded
at industry level. Strong trade union organizations and high union density at
the company level ensure the implementation of negotiated forms of
individualization and differentiation. In our view, this two-tier system
provides an institutional and legal framework that is favorable to the
emergence of negotiated flexibility.
Transformation
of the Social Protection System
The
various reforms of the Swedish social protection system undertaken during the
last decade have essentially taken the form of a temporary reduction of the
income replacement rate and, with perhaps the exception of the fundamental
restructuring of the tax and pension system, have left the Swedish welfare
state system almost intact. The Swedish social protection system remains, by
international standards, clearly universal and inclusive in nature and still
enjoys a high level of public support. The profound reshaping of the pension
system and the tax reform initiated in the early 1990s aimed at strengthening
work incentives, increasing labor force participation, and fostering investment
in human capital are also clearly in line with the general philosophy of the
original Swedish model favoring integrative transitions instead of passive
support and social exclusion.
Conclusion
The present Swedish model
appears today more in line with the three core components of the original model
developed and implemented during the 1950s and 1960s. The recent changes in
economic policy toward more restrictive and anti-inflationary macroeconomic policies,
the reorientation of active labor market policies toward supply-oriented
measures, and the structural reforms undertaken in the wage formation, tax, and
social protection systems suggest a revival and renaissance of the traditional
Swedish model.
After
a period of turbulence in the early 1990s, the Swedish economy has undergone a
particularly favorable economic development during the last decade.
Unemployment has been cut by half, inflation has been curbed, and the country
appears to have recovered from the deep economic crisis of the early 1990s.
Besides the reorientation of macroeconomic and employment policy, the recent
modifications in Swedish industrial relations, in particular the clear tendency
toward a re-coordination of wage bargaining, have without doubt played a vital
role in the Swedish recovery. These new developments reflect a desire on the
two sides of industry to re-coordinate collective bargaining at the industry
level and to restore the leading role of the traded goods sector in wage
formation. Sweden's various bipartite cooperation agreements concluded during
the late 1990s may be interpreted as a new historic compromise combining
employers' demands for greater flexibility with a desire on the part of the
trade union movement to restore full employment and sustained income growth.
Last
but not least, the third main element of the Rehn-Meidner model—the extensive
use of ALMPs, that is, the overall policy of activation—still occupies a central
role in Swedish stabilization policy, and its reorientation toward
supply-oriented measures (occupational and geographical mobility, active search
programs, etc.) in many respects stands out as well in accordance with the
strategy initiated in the 1950s.
Overall,
the recent modifications of the Swedish model creates an institutional
framework favorable to the emergence of negotiated flexibility and a return to
balanced economic and employment growth. In our view, these developments
reinforce the coherence of the Swedish model and the robustness of its social
cohesion.
Notes
The
present contribution is a revised and shortened version of D. Anxo and H. Niklasson,
"The Swedish Model in Turbulent Times: Decline or Renaissance?" International
Labour Review 145, no. 4 (2006).
1. Where
firms with relatively low productivity tend to disappear or reduce their labor
force due to the application of the solidarity wage policy.
2.
The Swedish model was initially formulated by the two Swedish economists Gšsta
Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, both employed at the Swedish Confederation of blue
collar workers, LO.
3. The
inflation target amounts to a 2 percent rise per year in the consumer price
index, within a corridor of plus or minus 1 percent.