Before turning to the substance of my talk, I first want to express
sincerest thanks to the members of the association for giving me the
opportunity to serve as their president for the past year. It has
certainly been a privilege and pleasure, and I am most grateful especially
to the officers and members of the Executive Board for their support
and cooperation. This evening at our general membership meeting Eileen
will become our new president, and I am confident she will provide
our association with superb leadership. Already as president-elect,
Eileen has given all of us a preview of the vigorous leadership she
will provide this organization, and I want to tell her how much I
have enjoyed collaborating with her during the past year. Last, but
certainly not least, I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to our
executive director, Paula Wells, who provides LERA with exemplary
service virtually every day of every year.
I also want to note, with sadness
and regret, the passing of Neil Chamberlain, who died last November
at the age of ninety-one. Neil served on the faculty at Yale and,
for many years, at Columbia, and he was one of the greatest of all
industrial relations scholars. He served as president of this association
in 1967 and was one of our first members to receive LERA's Lifetime
Achievement Award. For scholars of my generation, Neil was a giant—through
the rigor and originality of his research he inspired us to believe
that a career devoted to industrial relations research could be a
noble undertaking. We shall miss him.
For the past ten years, since
giving up the deanship at the School of Industrial and Labor Relations
(Cornell University), I have focused most of my energies on studying
workplace conflict and the emergence of new methods of managing and
resolving it. I would like to use this opportunity to recapitulate
some themes that my co-authors and I have framed in the research we
have conducted on conflict resolution over the past decade. This research
has been conducted under the auspices of the Institute on Conflict
Resolution at Cornell. I have had the good fortune of being able to
collaborate with several first-rate co-authors, most especially my
friend and colleague Ron Seeber, and also Harry Katz, Rocco Scanza,
Dick Fincher, Jon Brock, and Ariel Avgar (see, for example, Lipsky
and Seeber 1998, 2003, 2006; Seeber and Lipsky 2006; Lipsky et al.
2003; Lipsky and Katz 2006; Lipsky, Scanza, and Avgar 2006; Brock
and Lipsky 2003; Lipsky and Avgar 2004, 2006).
Here is my argument in a nutshell.
Beginning more than thirty years ago, the social contract that had
governed relations between workers and employers in the United States
for the period following World War II began to unravel. Other scholars,
most notably Tom Kochan, Harry Katz, and Bob McKersie, have charted
the transformation of American industrial relations that began in
the 1970s and to a great extent continues today (Kochan et al. 1986).
Seeber and I have argued that the emerging social contract that had
been produced by the transformation of U.S. industrial relations has
had particularly profound consequences for the handling of workplace
conflict. To a degree, the rise of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) has been the most obvious manifestation of how workplace conflict
is handled under the new social contract. But our research has led
us to believe that there is a much deeper, systemic shift that is
occurring in the management of workplace conflict. We have focused
on a development that moves conflict resolution significantly beyond
ADR—we have emphasized the significance of the emergence of
so-called integrated conflict management systems (Lipsky et al. 2003,
Lipsky and Seeber 2003).
Social Contract Theory
The theory of the social contract has its origins
in the work of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, most
notably Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The
Protestant Reformation and the decline in the authority of the Catholic
Church had served to weaken the divine authority of the monarchic
form of government. Europe had been ravaged by the wars of the Reformation,
and some philosophers recognized that the authority of the king, and
more generally civil government, needed a new justification. "In their
search, political theorists—and especially the Protestants among
them—turned to the old biblical concept of a covenant or contract, such as the one between God and Abraham
and the Israelites of the Old Testament" (Encyclopedia Britannica
n.d.; see also Hobbes 1651, Locke 1690, Rousseau 1762). In sum, a
social contract is a compact between rulers and their people that
defines their respective rights and duties. It justifies political
authority on the basis of reason and self-interest rather than divine
authority. In classical theory, a social contract was in the first
instance a means of preventing conflicts from arising. Under a social
contract, individuals exchange their unlimited liberty for the safety
and security provided by sovereign power. If conflicts arose, they
would be resolved by the sovereign.
The trail that connects the classical
concept of the social contract with the contemporary and popular use
of the term is a long and winding one. Nowadays the term that was
first meant to justify the sovereign authority of government is often
used to support the special interests of various stakeholder groups.
Nevertheless, Seeber and I have argued that the concept of the social
contract is useful in understanding the balance of rights and obligations
between employers and employees.
The Social Contract at the Workplace
The social contract that governs the workplace was initially
a compact fashioned out of the imperatives of industrialization. Industrialization
strengthened the authority of management to make decisions regarding
the products to be produced, the prices charged, the business location,
the investments needed in new technologies, and the deployment and
supervision of the workforce. Almost all organizations had a hierarchical
authority structure featuring top-down management at the workplace.
Managers and supervisors had the authority to direct employees. In
the absence of trade unions, that authority could not be questioned
unless management violated the law.
Under the hierarchical authority structure that prevailed in U.S.
enterprise through the last half of the nineteenth century and the
first part of the twentieth century, conflict was considered dysfunctional.
Managers never thought of conflict strategically. If they considered
it at all, it was usually a phenomenon they did their best to avoid,
suppress, or ignore. If, despite their best efforts, they were forced
to deal with conflicts with their employees, the remedy was to punish
those responsible. There was little tolerance for dissent at the workplace.
In sum, the nineteenth-century version of the workplace social contract
served to justify the sovereign authority of owners and managers.
But the historic rise of unionism
in the 1930s resulted in the transformation of the nineteenth-century
workplace social contract. The dramatic surge of unionism in the 1930s
was often accompanied by strikes and picketing and, occasionally,
violence. The passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 not only encouraged
workers to join unions and deterred violence; it also represented
a symbolic ascendancy of the collective rights over the individual
rights of workers in American jurisprudence.
The New Deal social contract that
emerged in the 1940s endured until the 1970s. Under the New Deal social
contract, managers gained a relatively free hand in controlling production
and the workforce, and employees gained access to good jobs at good
wages. By the end of World War II the United States was indisputably
the leading economy in the world. Both labor and management were eager
to rationalize and bring order to a chaotic workplace. Both sides
were willing to develop processes and procedures that would serve
to regulate employment relationships. Under the New Deal version of
the social contract, at many work sites a broad, if fragile, consensus
developed that would last more than thirty years. Managers recognized
the legitimacy of unions, unions restricted their concerns to well-defined
workplace issues, and government served as the impartial arbiter,
helping to ensure a level playing field.
Conceptually, the New Deal social
contract promised significant, tangible benefits to most individuals
and institutions in American society in exchange for their accepting
certain responsibilities and obligations. The scope of the New Deal
social contract was very broad—broader than the social contract
had ever been in the past—but clearly it did not include everyone.
Its most novel feature was probably its inclusion of trade unions.
But many women, most minorities, and almost all of the disabled were
excluded from the New Deal social contract.
For most workers, union and nonunion
alike, the New Deal social contract promised a comfortable middle-class
standard of living—provided the worker was a law-abiding, heterosexual,
white male. After World War II middle-class Americans were able to
enjoy a level of material well being that was unparalleled in world
history. The quid-pro-quo for the middle-class lifestyle was a set
of fairly rigid obligations and responsibilities, not only on the
job but off as well. Under the New Deal social contract, unions enjoyed
protections and privileges that had never previously existed and,
possibly, may never again be duplicated. Indeed, with hindsight, the
status of unions under the New Deal social contract could very well
be an aberration in U.S. history; whether that status can ever be
restored remains problematic.
The Unraveling of the New Deal Social Contract
By the 1970s the glue that had held the New Deal social
contract together had come unstuck. The forces bringing about the
transformation of the social contract included the increasing globalization
of business, the growth of multinational corporations, and the rapid
pace of technological change. These factors, in turn, required corporations
operating in international markets to accelerate the pace of their
decision making. No longer did most managers have the luxury of tolerating
any aspect of their business that dampened their ability to respond
to market pressures.
In the 1960s U.S. economic strength
was still based on its ability to produce and distribute manufactured
products, but by the 1980s its strength was based on its ability to
produce and distribute information. The United States had become a
knowledge-based economy. Also by the 1980s the "deindustrialization"
of the United States was in full swing. In most manufacturing industries,
dozens of plants were closed, jobs were permanently lost, and communities
were abandoned. The industrial centers of the northeast and the midwest
were left in shambles (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). As the twentieth
century wound to a close, the combination of globalization, heightened
competition, technological change, and deregulation had served to
undermine the terms and conditions of the New Deal social contract.
The Emergence of a New Social Contract
As the new millennium approached, there were increasing
calls for a new workplace social contract (Penner et al. 2000). At
a White House summit on jobs and the economy in 1998, for example,
the participants focused on creating new employer-employee relationships.
The conferees agreed that it had become "necessary to craft a new
social contract between employer and employee" incorporating the concept
of employability fostered through skills training and life-long learning.
Representatives of seemingly every political hue came to believe that
the demise of the New Deal social contract required a rebalancing
of the rights and obligations of employers and employees. On the left
end of the political spectrum, for example, Jeremy Rifkin, in his
book The End of Work, predicted that technological change and "hyper capitalism"—that
is, the spread of capitalism to all parts of the globe, including
Russia and China—would necessitate a new social contract that
incorporates a radical reordering of workplace relationships (Rifkin
1995). On the right end of the political spectrum, BusinessWeek described
how certain elements of the business community were attempting to
define a new position regarding the social responsibility of corporations:
In isolated pockets
of Corporate America, a middle path is slowly emerging, one that reflects
a new paradigm for business and society in a global market. It recognizes
that job security died with the 1980s—but concedes, too, that
employers bear an obligation to help workers through transitions,
and it attempts to align the interests of investors, managers, and
employees, aiming to share both the risks and rewards of doing business.
("Writing a New Social Contract" 1996)
A number of commentators have
pointed out that the demise of the New Deal social contract did not
lead to the emergence of a dominant system of employment relations.
The American labor market has always been characterized by segmentation
and balkanization, and globalization seems to have strengthened those
centrifugal tendencies. Harry Katz and Owen Darbishire, for example,
documented the existence of four patterns of work practices in the
United States and other industrialized countries: a low-wage employment
sector, featuring a high level of managerial discretion and informal
procedures; a human resource management model, characterized by above-average
contingent pay, teams, and a low level of unionism; a joint team-based
sector, featuring high pay, a high level of unionism, and a high level
of employee involvement and joint employer-union decision making;
and in the United States a small but significant sector that had adopted
a Japanese-oriented system featuring standardized procedures, employment
stabilization, and problem-solving teams (Katz and Darbishire 2000).
In the United States, outside
of the large and significant low-wage sector, the transformation of
the social contract is associated with a significant reorganization
of the way work is performed in many U.S. companies. A hallmark of
the reorganization of the workplace is the decline in the importance
of hierarchy and the rise of team-based work. Many U.S. employers
have discovered that employee performance and productivity can be
enhanced if employees are empowered to assume more responsibility
for the manner in which they perform their work. In many workplaces,
management has removed layers of supervision and delegated substantial
authority to teams of employees to control the direction of their
activities. In our research on conflict management systems, we studied
sixty major corporations in the United States, and all of them purported
to use a team-based system of production (Lipsky et al. 2003).
Most large American corporations, many of them working cooperatively
with their unions, experimented with a variety of workplace innovations
designed to foster employee involvement in decision making. Teams,
delayering, multiskilling, multitasking, contingent pay, empowerment,
and participation are all elements of a full-fledged high-performance
work system. By no means have all U.S. employers embraced all of these
elements, but Paul Osterman's research shows that a majority of large
companies adopted one or more of them (Osterman 1994, 2000). The reorganization
of the workplace was a consequence of management's drive for increased
flexibility in employment relations. Flexibility would allow them
to shed outdated work rules and practices, motivate employees, and
enhance employee productivity.
The Implications for Workplace Dispute Resolution
Many people—even professionals in our field—are
unaware of how widespread the use of ADR is in the United States.
Here is one definition of ADR: it involves the use of arbitration,
mediation, fact finding, facilitation, and other third-party processes
to resolve disputes that might otherwise be handled through litigation
(Lipsky et al. 2003). The dramatic growth in the use of ADR in recent
years clearly seems associated with the unraveling of the New Deal
social contract and the emergence of a new workplace compact.
Under the New Deal social contract,
arbitration, mediation, and other third-party techniques were seldom
used to resolve non-union employment disputes. But under the new social
contract at the workplace, the use of these techniques in employment
disputes has become commonplace. A variety of forces have resulted
in a shift in favor of private rather than governmental or collective
methods of resolving workplace disputes. Research suggests that there
are two proximate causes: one might be labeled "litigation avoidance"
and the other "union substitution" (Seeber and Lipsky 2006, Colvin
2003).
Litigation Avoidance
Beginning in the 1970s there was a widespread perception
among managers and corporate attorneys that employment litigation
was becoming increasingly costly and time consuming. The dockets of
federal, state, and local courts became crowded with a backlog of
unresolved disputes after the passage of new workplace legislation
in the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1970 and 1989, for example, employment
discrimination case filings increased by 2,166 percent (Ford 2000).
The business community's dissatisfaction with the legal system caused
it to search for measures that would alleviate the growing burden
of employment litigation. For example, it began to lobby for tort
reforms that would place limitations on civil lawsuits. The movement
for tort reform, however, had only piecemeal success, which probably
strengthened the business community's resolve to use ADR (Lipsky et
al 2003).
Facilitating the growth of ADR
has been a series of seminal decisions by the federal courts. Two
Supreme Court decisions (Gilmer in 1991 and Circuit City
Stores in 2001) supported an employer's right to require arbitration
even if it meant that an employee was denied access to the public
justice system. It is now clear that an American employer may, with
near total impunity, require an employee, as a condition of hiring
and continued employment, to use private arbitration as the means
of resolving public claims against the employer that involve a statutorily
protected right. Mandatory arbitration agreements have many critics,
and one, Kathy Stone, has called them the "yellow dog contract" of
our era (Stone 1996). Of course, such agreements have many defenders,
particularly in the business community (see, for example, Estreicher
2001).
Union Substitution
The ascendancy of ADR is to a large extent linked to the
decline of the labor movement in the United States. No informed observer
can possibly claim that the secular decline in the American labor
movement has been accompanied by a corresponding decline in workplace
conflict. All the evidence suggests that quite the contrary is the
case. Thus, the decline in collective representation has left a vacuum
in the available means of resolving workplace disputes, which has
been filled, at least in part, by the use of ADR. Many employers we
interviewed were astonished to discover that a union-free workplace
was seldom free of conflict (Lipsky et al. 2003).
In the interviews we conducted
with employers, we found that a handful acknowledged that they use
ADR as a means of avoiding unionization. Understandably, many unions
view ADR with skepticism, especially mandatory non-union arbitration.
The union movement has joined with civil rights organizations, the
plaintiffs' bar, and other liberal interest groups (such as the American
Civil Liberties Union) in opposing mandatory non-union arbitration.
On the other hand, some unions have embraced ADR, including voluntary
arbitration, because they believe ADR systems can extend the authority
and influence of a union into areas normally considered management
prerogatives (Lipsky et al. 2003, Robinson et al. 2005).
As a consequence of the use of
ADR, there has been a significant shift in the resolution of many
types of disputes—not only employment disputes—from the
court system to private forums. Some observers have claimed that this
shift represents the de facto privatization of the American system
of justice. One index of the privatization of our system of justice
is the declining trend in the use of trials in the United States.
For example, Samborn reports a significant drop in federal trials
over the last thirty years. In 1970, of the 127,280 civil and criminal
cases filed in the federal courts, 10 percent were resolved after
either a jury or a bench trial; by contrast, in 2001, of the 313,615
cases filed, only 2.2 percent were resolved by either a jury or a
bench trial (Samborn 2002). Evidence suggests similar trends in state
courts. Although several factors account for the phenomenon of "the
vanishing trial," most experts point to ADR as a major reason for
the decline (Stipanowich 2004).
The research we have conducted
over the last decade strongly suggests that ADR is firmly institutionalized
in a majority of American corporations, especially for employment
disputes. We have asserted that the use of ADR in the United States
passed the so-called tipping point in the 1990s. ADR is now so firmly
embedded in our laws, in both federal and state court systems, and
in the practices of our principal employers that there is simply no
going back to a bygone era. In our own research we did not find a
single corporation that had adopted the use of ADR and then abandoned
it. Quite the contrary: we discovered that ADR was a way station between
reliance on conventional methods of dispute resolution and the development
of integrated conflict management systems (Lipsky et al. 2003).
The companies we studied began
their journey by attempting to manage litigation; they then expanded
their concern to the management of disputes, and ultimately they reached
the point of systematically managing conflict. We discovered that
virtually every major corporation in the United States now uses ADR
to resolve employment disputes, but I need to acknowledge that not
more than 20 or 25 percent of the Fortune 1000 have adopted an authentic
integrated conflict management system. Those companies that have adopted
an integrated conflict management system have moved from a reactive
to a proactive, strategic approach to the management of conflict.
Top management in these companies regards the management of conflict
as akin to the management of any other corporate function, such as
sales, marketing, and finance. In contemporary U.S. organizations
the movement toward integrated conflict management systems is definitely
the cutting edge in workplace conflict resolution (Lipsky et al. 2003).
Conclusions
An intriguing question, in my view, is whether the
emerging social contract in the United States will constitute a new
and stable equilibrium, matching in endurance the traditional and
the New Deal versions of the social contract, or whether it represents
merely a transitional phase to other societal arrangements we can
scarcely imagine. We might consider the question in its broadest terms.
Francis Fukuyama, in his book The End of History
and the Last Man, argued
that Western-style democratic capitalism was achieving global hegemony
and would be the dominant politico-economic system indefinitely (Fukuyama
1992). Is the new social contract at the workplace, as Fukuyama might
argue, the end of history? If the past is any guide to the future,
it seems to me that the new social contract is not the end of history,
although it may be a significant stage in our evolution. John Dunlop
famously declared that a so-called industrial relations system consisted
of three sets of actors: a hierarchy of managers and their representatives,
a hierarchy of workers and their agents, and specialized government
agencies dedicated to employment relations. Dunlop believed that in
an industrial relations system there would be a tendency for the three
principal actors to achieve an equilibrium. He doubted that an industrial
relations system dominated by one or two of the actors could be sustained
over an extended period of time. He endorsed the so-called convergence
hypothesis, which holds that over time all industrial relations systems
dominated by one or two actors tend to become three-party systems
(Dunlop 1958). Under the new social contract in the United States,
managers have been in the ascendancy, and they have generally been
supported by government agencies. Personally, I share Dunlop's view
that a two-actor system is unlikely to be a stable one. A long-term
view of our industrial relations system suggests that ultimately there
will emerge a separate and independent voice for worker advocacy,
albeit not necessarily in the form of traditional unionism. If that
occurs, it is likely to diminish the role of ADR and conflict management
systems in employment relations.
But a realistic view of the short
term—the next ten or twenty years—suggests that the forces
and factors that have brought about the new social contract at the
workplace are unlikely to abate and, accordingly, there will continue
to be a need for new approaches to conflict resolution and conflict
management.
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